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The Supreme Court's Application
of "Ordinary Contract
Principles" to the Issue of the
Duration of Retiree Healthcare
Benefits: Perpetuating the
Interpretation/Gap-Filling
Quagmire
Robert A. Hillman*
Introduction
The U.S. Supreme Court purported to apply "ordinary contract
principles" in reversing the Sixth Circuit in M & G Polymers USA,
L.L.C. v. Tackett.' The Sixth Circuit had held that plaintiffs, retired
M & G employees, were entitled to lifetime healthcare benefits under
their union's Pension, Insurance, and Service Award Agreement (here-
inafter P&I agreement). 2 Justice Clarence Thomas, writing for a unan-
imous Court, concluded the Sixth Circuit had relied on a false set of
"inferences" established in International Union v. Yard-Man, Inc.' to
find that "in the absence of extrinsic evidence to the contrary the provi-
sions of [the collective bargaining agreement] indicated an intent to vest
retirees with lifetime benefits."4 The Supreme Court therefore re-
* Robert A. Hillman is the Edwin H. Woodruff Professor of Law at Cornell Law
School. Professor Hillman has written extensively on contracts and contract theory,
the Uniform Commercial Code, and employment law. Professor Hillman thanks Kevin
Clermont, David Hoffman, and Stewart Schwab for reading and commenting on this
Article.
1. 135 S. Ct. 926 (2015) (hereinafter M & G). At oral argument, Justice Sonia So-
tomayor introduced the phrase "ordinary contract principles." Questioning the peti-
tioner, she said, "You're recommending we apply ordinary contract principles, no?" Tran-
script of Oral Argument at 4, M & G, 135 S. Ct. 926 (No. 13-1010).
2. The plaintiffs represented a class of retired union workers from M & G's Point
Pleasant Polyester Plant. They alleged violations of section 301(a) of the Labor Management
Relations Act of 1947, 29 U.S.C. § 185(a), as well as section 502(aXl)(B) and section 502(a)(3)
of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1132(a)(1XB),
1132(a)(3). "To vest, in this context, means to remain binding 'beyond the expiration of
the collective bargaining agreement.'" Tackett v. M & G Polymers USA, L.L.C. 733 F3d
589, 596 (6th Cir. 2013) (hereinafter Tackett II).
3. 716 F.2d 1476 (6th Cir. 1983) (hereinafter Yard-Man).
4. M & G, 135 S. Ct. at 933.
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manded the case, instructing the lower court to disregard the inferences
and to apply "ordinary contract principles" to determine the parties' in-
tentions with respect to the duration of retiree healthcare benefits.6
The Court's decision to remand was correct, but its discussion and
application of "ordinary contract principles" was quite amateurish.
The concurrence's analysis was better, but left unclear the appropriate
judicial approach to ambiguity or omission in a contract.6 Unfortu-
nately, the decision caused uncertainty about what evidence may be
considered in similar cases, including cases that go beyond the collec-
tive bargaining context.
This Article documents the Supreme Court's errors in applying
"ordinary contract principles." In doing so, the Article suggests how
courts should proceed in contract cases like M & G. Specifically, in ap-
plying "ordinary contract principles," the Court should have treated
the "Yard-Man inferences"7 as probative, along with all other evidence
concerning the duration of healthcare benefits. Further, the Court
should have framed the inquiry as first seeking to determine a reason-
able interpretation of the P&I on the duration issue, instead of fixating
on the "parties' intentions,"8 which led the Court down the wrong path.
Ultimately, the Court should have instructed the lower court that if
the trier of fact could not determine the duration of healthcare benefits
based on a reasonable interpretation of the agreement and circum-
stances, the court should fill the gap from available contract-law gap
fillers. This approach would free future courts from the unhelpful de-
tour of trying to find the "intention of the parties" when, as we shall
see in M & G, the parties never reached agreement on the duration
issue. This roadmap would have avoided the Supreme Court's repudi-
ation of the "Yard-Man inferences," as if they were not an application
of "ordinary contracts principles."9
I. Yard-Man and M & G
A. International Union v. Yard-Man, Inc.
Under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA),
which in part governs pension and welfare benefits under collective
bargaining agreements (CBA), healthcare benefits, unlike pensions,
do not automatically vest.1o Instead, the duration of benefits depends
on the terms of the collective bargaining agreement." In Yard-Man,
5. Id.
6. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg wrote the concurring opinion, joined by Justices
Stephen Breyer, Sonia Sotomayor, and Elena Kagan. Id. at 937 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
7. M & G, 135 S. Ct. at 933.
8. Id.
9. See infra Part II.
10. 29 U.S.C. § 1051(1) (2012); M & G, 135 S. Ct. at 933. Under ERISA, the contract
determines when a pension vests. Id.
11. 29 U.S.C. § 1102(a)(1).
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the Sixth Circuit analyzed whether the employer breached the CBA by
terminating retiree healthcare benefits.' 2
The Sixth Circuit affirmed the trial court's determination that the
CBA at issue guaranteed lifelong health retiree benefits (but reversed
on other grounds).1 3 The court relied on "basic principles of contrac-
tual interpretation" to determine the "parties' intent."14 The court
identified a helpful hierarchy of relevant factors:
[T]he court should first look to the explicit language of the collective
bargaining agreement for clear manifestations of intent. The in-
tended meaning of even the most explicit language can, of course,
only be understood in light of the context which gave rise to its inclu-
sion. The court should also interpret each provision in question as
part of the integrated whole. If possible, each provision should be
construed consistently with the entire document and the relative po-
sitions and purposes of the parties. As in all contracts, the collective
bargaining agreement's terms must be construed so as to render
none nugatory and avoid illusory promises. Where ambiguities exist,
the court may look to other words and phrases in the collective bar-
gaining agreement for guidance. Variations in language used in
other durational provisions of the agreement may, for example, pro-
vide inferences of intent useful in clarifying a provision whose in-
tended duration is ambiguous. [T]he interpretation rendered [should]
not denigrate or contradict basic principles of federal labor law.'
The Sixth Circuit then applied this framework.' 6 First, it identi-
fied pertinent language of the agreement, "[tihe Company will provide
insurance benefits equal to the active group benefits .. . for the former
employee and his spouse," but found that the language was ambiguous
because it could have referred to the nature of retiree benefits or could
have incorporated "some durational limitation as well."' 7 The court
then turned to the rest of the CBA for guidance.' 8 The CBA expressly
set forth a termination schedule for active employees' benefits.' 9 But
these were "under conditions-the layoff of seniority employees-
typically inapplicable to retirees."2 0 In addition, variations in the dura-
tion of active employee healthcare benefits based on seniority made it
unlikely that retiree benefits depended on "the fortunes of active em-
12. 716 F.2d 1476, 1478 (6th Cir. 1983).
13. Id.
14. Id. at 1479.
15. Id. at 1479-80 (internal citation omitted). The applicable law is the general
"federal labor law." Gregory Parker Rogers, Rethinking Yard-Man A Return to Funda-
mental Contract Principles in Retiree Benefits Litigation, 37 EmoRy L.J. 1033, 1041
(1988).
16. Yard-Man, 716 F.2d It 1480.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 1481.
20. Id.
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ployees." 2 1 Further, Yard-Man continued to pay benefits to retirees be-
yond when they could have been discontinued for active employees,
"indicat[ing] that it did not consider retiree benefits to be tied to the
durational limitations of that active group." 22
Upon retirees' deaths, the CBA also limited health insurance for
the retirees' immediate families to the duration of the collective bar-
gaining agreement, suggesting that retiree healthcare benefits, silent
on duration, should be treated differently.23 Further, the agreement in-
cluded many specific additional limits on duration, including one deal-
ing with "savings and pension plan programs."24 The court reasoned
that the absence of a specific duration clause for retiree health insur-
ance benefits suggested that the parties had different intentions with
respect to their duration, specifically that they vested upon retire-
ment.2 5 The Sixth Circuit was not troubled by the CBA's "routine
duration clause" of three years in the CBA that, because of its gener-
ality, did not trump the other more specific evidence of intent.26
Perhaps most persuasive to the Yard-Man court, and a highly con-
tentious issue in the Supreme Court, was that healthcare benefits were
"permissive [and] not mandatory subjects of collective bargaining."27
The court believed such delayed compensation ordinarily would not be
left for future negotiation.28 In a revealing passage, the court inferred
that retirees likely traded current compensation for vested insurance
benefits-"If [retirees] forego wages now in expectation of retiree bene-
fits, they would want assurance that once they retire they will continue
to receive such benefits regardless of the bargain reached in subsequent
agreements. "29
Some of the Sixth Circuit's arguments seem less persuasive.3 0
However, Yard-Man generally gives the impression that the accumula-
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 1481-82.
25. Id. at 1482-83.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 1482. "Although ERISA imposes elaborate minimum funding and vesting
standards for pension plans, it explicitly exempts welfare benefits plans from those
rules." M & G, 135 S. Ct. at 933; see also Allied Chem. & Alkali Workers of Am., Local
Union No. l v. Pittsburgh Glass, 404 U.S. 157, 180 (1971) (retiree benefits not mandatory
bargaining subject).
28. Yard-Man, 716 F.2d at 1482.
29. Id.
30. For example, the court reasoned that the promise of healthcare benefits when
an employee turned sixty-five would be illusory for early retirees between the age of fifty-
five and sixty-two because the CBA containing this promise lasted only three years. Id.
at 1481. True, the promise would be worthless to early retirees, but as the Supreme
Court pointed out, the promise was not illusory for employees who retire at sixty-five.
A "promise that is 'partly' illusory is by definition not illusory." M & G, 135 S. Ct. at 936.
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tion of CBA factors persuaded the court that the parties intended to
vest the retirees' insurance benefits.
B. M & G Polymers USA v. Tackett in the Lower Courts
1. Tackett v. M & G Polymers, USA, L.L.C. (Tackett I)31
M & G purchased a polyester plant in 2000 and entered into a CBA
and P&I agreement with the employees' union.32 When M & G began to
require employees to contribute toward their healthcare benefits, Tack-
ett and other retirees representing a class of retired workers, along with
the union, sued, claiming that the P&I agreement guaranteed them life-
time contribution-free healthcare benefits.3 3 The disputed P&I language
stated:
Employees who retire on or after January 1, 1996 and who are eligi-
ble for and receiving a monthly pension under the 1993 Pension
Plan ... whose full years of attained age and full years of attained
continuous service . . . at the time of retirement equals 95 or more
points will receive a full Company contribution towards the cost of
[healthcare] benefits described in ... Exhibit B-1 .... Employees
who have less than 95 points at the time of retirement will receive
a reduced Company contribution. 34
Exhibit B-1 described the disputed healthcare benefits with this
introductory language: "Effective January 1, 1998, and for the dura-
tion of this Agreement thereafter, the Employer will provide the fol-
lowing program of hospital benefits, hospital-medical benefits, surgical
benefits and prescription drug benefits for eligible employees and their
dependents . . . ."35
M & G moved to dismiss the complaint, alleging in part that the
P&I agreement did not confer lifetime contribution-free healthcare
benefits.36 M & G offered evidence of "side letter agreements" that it
claimed were incorporated into the P&I agreement to cap M & G's con-
tribution to the cost of the benefits.37 The district court held that "the
'full Company contribution' language did not plausibly state a claim
for vested health care benefits."3 8
31. 561 F.3d 478 (6th Cir. 2009) (hereinafter Tackett 1).
32. The union was United Steel, Paper and Forestry, Rubber, Manufacturing, En-
ergy, Allied Industrial and Service Workers International Union, AFL-CIO-CLC. Id. at
480. The plaintiffs alleged violations of section 301 of the Labor Management Relations
Act of 1947, 29 U.S.C. § 185(a), and section 502(a)(1)(B) of the Employee Retirement In-
come Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1132(a)(1)(B). Tackett 1, 561 F.3d at 481.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 482.
35. M & G, 135 S. Ct. at 931.
36. Tackett I, 561 F.3d at 482.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 483.
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The Court of Appeals disagreed.3 9 In testing the sufficiency of the
Tackett complaint, the Sixth Circuit stated that it would "appl[y] the
principles first described" in Yard-Man and set forth the Yard-Man
framework of evaluating the CBA's "explicit language" and, if ambig-
uous, "extrinsic evidence," each pertaining to the duration of health-
care benefits.4 0 Having implicitly concluded that the P&I agreement
was ambiguous,4 1 the court examined additional relevant language
of the agreement for guidance. 42 Specifically, the court reasoned that
the "limiting language," which required employees to contribute to
their health benefits if they had insufficient seniority points to qualify
for "a full Company contribution," meant employees who had sufficient
points would receive lifetime benefits. 43 Further, the court stated that,
because pension benefits vest under ERISA, "[l]anguage in a collective
bargaining agreement that 'equate[es] eligibility for retiree health
benefits with eligibility for a pension' suggests an intent to vest.""
The court also relied on the context of the P&I agreement bargain-
ing: "[B]ecause retirement health care benefits are not mandatory or
required to be included in an agreement, and because they are 'typi-
cally understood as a form of delayed compensation or reward for
past services' it is unlikely that they would be 'left to the contingencies
of future negotiations."' 4 5 Relying on Yard-Man, the court found it "un-
likely that [the union] would agree to language that ensures its mem-
bers a 'full Company contribution,' if the company could unilaterally
change the level of contribution." 46
The court further reasoned that the applicability of the side letters
was a fact issue to be decided at trial.4 7 The court concluded that the
complaint was "plausible" and not subject to dismissal.4 8 One can see
that Tackett I relied on the earlier Yard-Man roadmap of contract in-
terpretation, but this was far from the end of the saga.
39. Id. at 490.
40. Id. at 489.
41. "The qualifying language in Thckett I implied that the CBA language, though
indicating intent to vest, contained enough ambiguity to permit examination of such ad-
ditional evidence." Tackett v. M & G Polymers USA, 733 F.3d 589, 600 (6th Cir. 2013).
The Sixth Circuit in Thckett I disagreed with the district court on the meaning of "full
Company contribution." Tackett 1, 561 F.3d at 490. The trial court had treated the lan-
guage as a "potential contribution," but the Sixth Circuit stated that the language "sug-
gests that the parties intended the employer to cover the full cost of health-care benefits
for those employees meeting the age and term-of-service requirements." Id.
42. Tackett 1, 561 F.3d at 490.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 489 (quoting McCoy v. Meridian Auto. Sys., Inc., 390 F.3d 417, 421 (6th
Cir. 2004)).
45. Id. (quoting Yolton v. El Paso Tenn. Pipeline Co., 435 F.3d 571, 580 (6th Cir.
2006) (quoting Int'l Union v. Yard-Man, Inc, 716 F.2d 1476, 1481-82 (6th Cir. 1983))).
46. Id. at 490.
47. Id. at 482 n.1.
48. Id. at 490.
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2. Tackett v. M & G Polymers, USA, L.L.C. (Tackett II)49
On remand from Tackett I, the district court declined to revisit the
vesting issue, assuming it had been decided by Tackett I. The court
granted a permanent injunction ordering that the plaintiffs receive re-
tiree healthcare benefits for life.50 M & G appealed, alleging two er-
rors.5 ' First, the trial court should have found that the side letters re-
quiring contributions and capping benefits (and other like documents)
were part of the P&I agreement. 52 Second, even without the letters,
the P&I agreement did not grant retirees lifetime benefits.5 3
The Sixth Circuit in Tackett II affirmed the trial court's decision
that the side letters were not part of the agreement, largely because
"several parties with authority to bind M & G and the union rejected
or disputed [the side] letter[s'] applicability." 54 The trial court erred,
however, according to Tackett II, in relying too heavily on one sentence
in Tackett I to find that the decision conclusively decided the vesting
issue.5 5 The Sixth Circuit wrote in Tackett I that "[t]he determina-
tion. . . . that the parties intended health care benefits to vest carries
over to the ERISA. . . claim."56 In Tackett II, however, the Sixth Cir-
cuit explained that it had not decided the vesting issue based on a
"complete factual record" and that "Tackett I did not conclusively de-
termine that Plaintiffs' retirement benefits had vested.""
This Article need not analyze whether the side letters should have
been considered part of the P&I agreement.5 8 Nevertheless, they are
relevant to the issue of whether the retirees were guaranteed lifetime
healthcare benefits. 59 An argument that did not surface clearly at any
level of litigation was whether M & G's insistence that the side letters
capped the plaintiffs' healthcare rights showed that M & G did not be-
lieve the P&I agreement alone reasonably could be read to cap bene-
fits. At best, the side letters showed that M & G wanted to cap benefits,
but the finding that the letters did not become part of the agreement
suggests that M & G failed to achieve that goal.
49. 733 F.3d 589 (6th Cir. 2013).
50. The district court's injunction restored the benefits based on the "current ver-
sions of the benefits plans they were enrolled in until 2007." The plaintiffs cross-
appealed and sought benefits based on the pre-2007 agreement. Id. at 592-93.
51. Id. at 592.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 598. See infra notes 58, 197-99, and accompanying text for further dis-
cussion of side letters.
55. Id. at 596-97.
56. Tackett v. M & G Polymers, USA, L.L.C., 561 F.3d 478, 491 (6th Cir. 2009)
(Tackett I).
57. Tackett H, 733 F.3d at 596-97.
58. "The letters were not reproduced in P&I booklets and allegedly not ratified as
part of the local agreement." Id. at 595.
59. Id. at 598-99.
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At any rate, in determining the P&I agreement's meaning, Tack-
ett II confirmed the Sixth Circuit's earlier view that the "full contribu-
tion" language of the P&I agreement "indicated an intent to vest."6 0
Because the language's meaning was ambiguous, however, the court
entertained extrinsic evidence.6 ' Ultimately, because of trial testi-
mony, the linkage between healthcare benefits and pension benefits,
the reasoning of Tackett I, and M & G's failure to provide evidence
to rebut the "full contribution" language, 62 the court affirmed the
trial court's vesting decision and granted a permanent injunction in
favor of the plaintiffs.63
Nonetheless, Tackett II denied the plaintiffs cross-appeal with re-
spect to the injunction's scope.64 The plaintiffs had asserted that the
trial court erred when it "ordered retirees and dependents previously
enrolled in the pre-2007" plan to receive benefits under the 2007 plan
that contained "increased prescription drug costs and annual deduct-
ibles."65 Following precedent, 66 the court limited vested benefits by al-
lowing "reasonable changes" to accommodate increased costs.6 7 One
can only think that the "reasonable changes" declaration was the
court's attempt to craft a compromise, but more on this later.6 8
C. M & G Polymers USA, L.L.C. v. Tackett (M & G in the
Supreme Court)69
M & G took Tackett II to the Supreme Court. 70 In a unanimous
opinion written by Justice Clarence Thomas, with Justices Ruth Gins-
burg, Stephen Breyer, Sonia Sotomayor, and Elena Kagan concurring,
the Court first stated it would apply "ordinary principles of contract
law" consistent with federal labor policy.'7 The Court then indicated
it would look to the "parties' intentions" and the "plainly expressed in-
tent" of the agreement as the appropriate "ordinary principles." 72
The Court foreshadowed its decision by criticizing the Sixth Cir-
cuit for "appl[ying] the Yard-Man inferences to conclude that, in the
absence of extrinsic evidence to the contrary, the provisions of the con-
60. Id. at 600.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 601.
65. Id. at 600-01.
66. Reese v. CNH Am. L.L.C., 574 F.3d 315, 326 (6th Cir. 2009).
67. Tackett II, 733 F.3d at 601.
68. See infra notes 180-89 and accompanying text.
69. 135 S. Ct. 926 (2015).
70. Id. at 930.
71. Id. at 933.
72. Id. The Court also stated: "Where the words of a contract in writing are clear
and unambiguous, its meaning is to be ascertained in accordance with its plainly ex-
pressed intent.'" Id. (citing 11 SAMUEL WILLISTON & RicHARD R. LORD, WILLISTON ON CON-
TRAcTs § 30:6, Westlaw (4th ed. Database updated May 2016)).
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tract indicated an intent to vest retirees with lifetime benefits."7 3 In
fact, those "inferences," according to the Court, were not "ordinary
principles of contract law"74 and the Court rejected them.7 5
The Court elaborated. First, the Court accused Yard-Man and its
progeny of "placing a thumb on the scale in favor of vested retiree ben-
efits in all collective-bargaining agreements." 76 The Court found the
Sixth Circuit's reliance on the context of collective bargaining agree-
ments was "too speculative" and was derived from the court's "own
suppositions" instead of the record.77 Such speculations "distort[ed]
the attempt to 'ascertain the intention of the parties.'"78 Instead, the
Sixth Circuit should have looked to the record for proof of "customs
or usages."7 To demonstrate an example of Yard-Man's trip down
the wrong path, the Court singled out the Sixth Circuit's "supposi-
tionl]" that "'when . . . parties contract for benefits which accrue
upon achievement of retiree status, there is an inference that the par-
ties likely intended those benefits to continue as long as the benefi-
ciary remains a retiree.'"so
Second, the Court said that Yard-Man "rest[ed] on a shaky factual
foundation" in categorizing healthcare benefits as deferred compensa-
tion.8 ' Without elaboration, the Court reasoned that ERISA health-
care benefits are "welfare plans" and "Congress specifically defined
plans that 'resul[t] in a deferral of income by employees' as pension
plans .... ."82
Third, the Court criticized Yard-Man for discounting "general
durational clauses" and especially criticized later Sixth Circuit cases
that, according to the Court, created a default rule of vested health-
care benefits. 83 The Court thought that such an approach conflicted
with the presumption that the written agreement constituted the en-
tire agreement. 84
Fourth, the Court articulated what it identified as relevant "tradi-
tional" contract principles that shed better light on the Court's goal of
determining the parties' intentions.8 5 For example, the Court ex-
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 937.
76. Id. at 935. For a discussion of the many cases leading up to Yard-Man and be-
yond, see Rogers, supra note 15.
77. M & G, 135 S. Ct. at 935.
78. Id. (quoting WILLISTON ON CONTRACTs § 30:2, supra note 72).
79. Id.
80. Id. (quoting Int'l Union v. Yard-Man, Inc., 716 F.2d 1476, 1482 (6th Cir. 1983)).
81. Id. at 936.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id. For a discussion of inferences and presumptions, see infra notes 100-09 and
accompanying text.
85. Id. at 936-37.
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plained that ambiguous writings do not create lifetime promises, and
promises silent on duration "will ordinarily be treated ... as 'operative
for a reasonable time.'"86 Further, contractual obligations cease when
the contract terminates.8 7 Perhaps overly influenced by these "princi-
ples," the Court then went so far as to volunteer that absent "explicit
terms . . . when a contract is silent as to the duration of retiree bene-
fits, a court may not infer that the parties intended those benefits to
vest for life."8 8 This language seemingly precluded plaintiffs from de-
feating a summary judgment motion regardless of the circumstances.
The Court then concluded that the Sixth Circuit in Tackett I and II
based its decision largely on Yard-Man and its progeny 89 and re-
manded the case to the Sixth Circuit to review the duration issue with-
out reliance on the Yard-Man inferences.9 0 The Court singled out the
Sixth Circuit's misdirected focus on context and the likelihood that the
union "would not have agreed to language ensuring its members a 'full
Company contribution' if the company could change the level of that
contribution." 9 1 By ruling out the use of Yard-Man inferences to
prove the parties intended benefits to last for life, the Court created
a bit of a mystery on what the Sixth Circuit was to do on remand to
review the case "under the correct legal principles."9 2
Justice Ginsburg wrote the concurrence joined by Justices Breyer,
Sotomayor, and Kagan. 93 The concurrence also directed the Sixth Cir-
cuit on remand to search for the "intention of the parties."94 However,
the concurrence recognized that "clear and express" language is not
necessary to show that the parties intended lifetime retiree health
benefits. 9 5 Such benefits can be implied from the circumstances. 96
This position challenged the majority's assertion that "when a contract
is silent as to the duration of retiree benefits, a court may not infer
that the parties intended those benefits to vest for life."97 The concur-
rence also singled out certain terms that would be relevant in deter-
mining the vesting issue.98
86. Id. at 936 (quoting 3A ARTHuR LErroN CoaRsN, CoRBN ON CONTRACTS § 553 (2d ed.
1960)).
87. Id.
88. Id. at 937.
89. Id. ("[Tihere is no doubt that Yard-Man and its progeny affected the outcome
here.").
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id. (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
94. Id.
95. Id. at 938.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 937 (majority opinion).
98. Id. at 938 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) ("Because the retirees have a vested, life-
time right to a monthly pension ... a provision stating that retirees 'will receive' health-
care benefits if they are 'receiving a monthly pension' is relevant to this examina-
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II. Problems with the Supreme Court Opinion
The Supreme Court misunderstood "ordinary contract princi-
ples" 99 and their application to the M & G dispute. It is important
first to comment briefly on the Court's focus on the Yard-Man infer-
ences. An inference arises when evidence reasonably supports the
probability of the fact being proven-for example, the Sixth Circuit
thought that a retirement benefit created the inference that the bene-
fit lasts as long as the employee is retired. 100 Once an inference arises,
the party offering the evidence has met its burden of production and
can avoid summary judgment or a directed verdict.1 01 A presumption,
on the other hand, means that the party offering the evidence has sat-
isfied its burden of persuasion, which shifts to the opposing party (at
minimum) the burden of production on the issue. 102
Much of the Supreme Court's opinion criticizes the Sixth Circuit's
use of the Yard-Man inferences, but its primary objection appears to be
that the Sixth Circuit used the inferences to create a presumption of
lifetime retiree healthcare benefits.1 03 For example, the Court re-
versed the Sixth Circuit's affirmance of the presumption that, "in
the absence of extrinsic evidence to the contrary, the agreements indi-
cated an intent to vest lifetime contribution-free benefits."1 04 The
Court's criticism of Yard-Man's "thumb on the scale" 0 5 in favor of
vesting also strongly suggests that the Court thought Yard-Man and
its progeny shifted the burden of proof on the vesting issue. Further,
Justice Ginsburg's concurrence interpreted Justice Thomas's opinion
as rejecting the Yard-Man "presumptions": "Today's decision rightly
holds that courts must apply ordinary contract principles, shorn of
presumptions, to determine whether retiree health-care benefits sur-
vive the expiration of a collective-bargaining agreement." 0 6 Finally,
tion. . . . So is a 'survivor benefits' clause instructing that if a retiree dies, her surviving
spouse will 'continue to receive [the retiree's health-care] benefits . . . until death or
remarriage.'").
99. Id. at 935 (majority opinion).
100. Id. at 933 ("[Tjhe Court of Appeals applied the Yard-Man inferences to con-
clude that ... the provisions of the contract indicated an intent to vest retirees with life-
time benefits.").
101. See, e.g., RICHARD H. FIELD ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE: MATERIALS FOR A BASIC
COURSE 1328-33 (10th ed. 2010).
102. "[Wlhen a designated basic fact exists, a certain presumed fact must be taken
to exist in the absence of adequate rebuttal." Id. at 1340.
103. See M & G, 135 U.S. at 935. Ordinarily, the plaintiff has the burden of persua-
sion to prove its case. The presumption here would shift the burden of proof to M & G.
104. Id. at 932. In fact, the Court used terminology such as "inference," "presump-
tion," and "supposition" almost interchangeably throughout the opinion.
105. Id. at 935.
106. Id. at 937 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
309
310 32 ABA JouRNAL OF LABOR & EMPLOYMENT LAw 299 (2017)
the Court singled out post-Yard-Man cases that the Court believed had
taken Yard-Man too far toward a presumption of vesting.107
Understanding the Court's evidentiary language and reasoning is
important to explain how the Court went wrong in applying ordinary
contract principles. The Court probably was correct that the inferences
together were insufficiently compelling to create a presumption that
shifted the burden of persuasion to M & G.10 But the Court should
not have entirely rejected the Yard-Man inferences. Instead, the
Court should have explained that, as ordinary contract principles,
the inferences created an issue for the trier of fact. 109
Each of the Sixth Circuit's inferences was relevant to the duration
of retiree healthcare benefits. Further, the inferences together, if not
separately, were sufficiently probative to reach the trier of fact. This
Part explains why this is so and how the Court lost its way.
A. The Court's Focus on the Parties' Intentions
Although courts interpreting contract language often invoke the
"intentions of the parties" rubric,110 the reality of how they proceed
is quite different."' Courts generally enforce a reasonable interpreta-
tion of the language-an objective test-rather than an interpretation
107. Id. at 935 (majority opinion) (discussing Cole v. ArvinMeritor, Inc., 549 F.3d
1064, 1074 (6th Cir. 2008) and Noe v. PolyOne Corp., 520 F.3d 548, 555 (6th Cir. 2008)).
108. Courts create presumptions in part based on probability: "Most presumptions
have come into existence primarily because the judges have believed that proof of fact B
renders the inference of the existence of fact A so probable that it is sensible and time-
saving to assume the truth of fact A until the adversary disproves it." 2 KENNETH S.
BROuN, MCCORMICK ON EvIDENCE § 343 (7th ed. 2013). Yard-Man's reasoning alone,
while probative, is not so probable that it should shift the burden of persuasion to
M & G. For example, Yard-Man's inference that retiree healthcare benefits can be a
form of deferred compensation is not so probable that it calls for assuming the truth
of the inference. Further, "a presumption will be superimposed on an inference in situ-
ations of special need in the proof process, such as where the opponent has unique access
to evidence on the disputed fact. In [M & G], there is no suggestion of a need for the over-
kill of creating a presumption." E-mail from Kevin M. Clermont, Prof. of Law, Cornell
Law Sch., to Robert A. Hillman, Prof. of Law, Cornell Law Sch., (Jan. 24, 2017, 5:15
EST) (on file with author).
109. See generally Reese v. CNH Indus. NV., 143 F. Supp. 3d 609 (E.D. Mich. 2015).
For a post-Supreme Court trial court decision in another retiree case, in which the court
took this position on a motion to reconsider, see infra notes 202-06 and accompanying
text.
110. ROBERT A. HiUmN, PRINCIPLES OF CONTRACT LAw 287-88 (3d ed. 2014) (citing
Portell v. AmeriCold Logistics, L.L.C., 571 F.3d 822, 824 (8th Cir. 2009)) ("The cardinal
principle of contract interpretation is to ascertain the intention of the parties and to give
effect to that intent.' We read the contract as a whole and give the terms their 'plain, or-
dinary, and usual meaning.'") (quoting Dunn Indus. Group, Inc. v. City of Sugar Creek,
112 S.W3d 421, 428 (Mo. 2003) (per curiam)).
111. Id. at 280 ("[O]ne of contract law's important goals is to facilitate freely made
private agreements. It is therefore not surprising to find language in opinions that is
consistent with this goal, even when courts are giving lip service to the idea when inter-
preting language.").
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based on what either party subjectively thinks the language means.1 12
"[T]he objective approach to interpretation ... measures a party's lan-
guage and conduct against the test of reasonableness and sanctions
careless, reckless, or purposeful misleading language by finding an ob-
ligation even if the promisor did not intend one."113 An exception oc-
curs if the court finds that at the time of contracting both parties sub-
jectively agreed to an objectively unreasonable meaning (for example,
the parties intended 500 to mean 300).114 However, this situation is ob-
viously unusual. Although the "intentions of the parties" slogan is not
harmful if the court applies the objective test, we will see that the Su-
preme Court, influenced by the "intentions" language, guides future
courts to apply the objective test too narrowly.1 15
Courts disagree on the process and kinds of evidence necessary to
determine a reasonable interpretation of contract language. In some
jurisdictions, the "plain meaning rule," which prohibits extrinsic evi-
dence,1 16 prevails if the court determines that the language at issue
is not ambiguous.11 7 Under this approach, the court need go no further
to establish meaning than reading the disputed term. 8 Courts apply-
ing the "contextual" approach, however, generally entertain extrinsic
evidence to establish meaning, including preliminarily whether a writ-
ing is ambiguous.11 9 Further, "[tihe entire agreement . . . should be
112. See, e.g., Zell v. Am. Seating Co., 138 F2d 641, 647 (2d Cir. 1943), rev'd, 322 U.S.
709 (1944) (per curiam) ("We ask judges or juries to discover that 'objective viewpoint'-
through their own subjective processes."); see also Robert A. Hillman, Contract Lore, 27
J. CoR. L. 505, 510-12 (2002).
113. HILUmAN, supra note 110, at 280; see also Judge Learned Hand's observation in
Hotchkiss v. National City Bank, 200 F. 287, 293 (S.D.N.Y. 1911) ("A contract has, strictly
speaking, nothing to do with the personal, or individual, intent of the parties... . If, how-
ever, it were proved by twenty bishops that either party, when he used the words, in-
tended something else than the usual meaning which the law imposes upon them, he
would still be held, unless there were some mutual mistake, or something else of the
sort.").
114. See, e.g., Hield v. Thyberg, 347 N.W.2d 503, 504, 508 (Minn. 1984) ($15,000
meant $50,000).
115. See infra notes 125-34 and accompanying text.
116. Extrinsic evidence includes "all writings, oral statements, and other conduct
by which the parties manifested their assent, together with any prior negotiations be-
tween them and any applicable course of dealing, course of performance, or usage."
E. AuLA FARNSWORTH, CoNTRACTs 453 (4th ed. 2004).
117. See, e.g., Pioneer Peat, Inc. v. Quality Grassing & Servs., Inc., 653 N.W.2d 469,
473 (Minn. Ct. App. 2002) (court decides on textual basis).
118. See Joshua M. Silverstein, Using the West Key Number System as a Data Col-
lection and Coding Device for Empirical Legal Scholarship: Demonstrating the Method
via a Study of Contract Interpretation, 34 J. L. & COM. 203, 253-61 (2016) (usefully de-
scribing textualists and contextualists).
119. See, e.g., id. at 254-55 (explaining that contextualist courts often use evidence
of prior negotiations, commercial circumstances, and trade usage (among other factors)
to interpret a contract). The issue arises in other interpretative contexts as well: "Several
substantive principles of interpretation-such as constitutional avoidance, use of legis-
lative history, and Chevron-depend on an initial determination of whether a text is
clear or ambiguous. But judges often cannot make that initial clarity versus ambiguity
312 32 ABA JOURNAL OF LABOR & EMPLOYMENT LAw 299 (2017)
read together in light of all the circumstances."1 20 One can see that an
agreement's context strongly influences courts' interpretations under
the contextual approach and that the Yard-Man court favored this in-
terpretive method. 121
The debate continues over which interpretative method should
prevail. Proponents of the plain meaning approach caution that courts
make too many mistakes digesting extrinsic evidence, while contextu-
alists maintain that words alone have no meaning in the absence of
context.1 2 2 The distinction between these schools is less important
here because the P&I agreement in M & G lacked an express health-
care duration term.1 23 Thus, the plain meaning rule could not apply.
The Supreme Court recognized the value of "known customs or us-
ages,"1 24 suggesting that the Court was not completely averse to the
contextualist strategy and reasonableness test, but the opinion took
a narrow view of the probative evidence.
In fact, the Court's failure to acknowledge the reasonableness test
and its fruitless search for the parties' intentions led the Court to narrow
the scope of probative evidence and to an impoverished view of ordinary
contract principles.1 25 The Court said so itself. According to the Court,
the Yard-Man inferences "distort[ed] the attempt'to ascertain the inten-
tion of the parties.'"126 If the Court had framed the inquiry as a test of
reasonableness, however, the Court may have seen the "Yard-Man infer-
ences" in a different light-as probative but not definitive-in a more
complete contextual investigation.
Consider again the Yard-Man inferences: retiree healthcare bene-
fits can be a form of deferred compensation; healthcare benefits likely
last while the former employee is a retiree; tying healthcare benefits to
pension benefits suggests that healthcare benefits vest.1 27 These infer-
ences, based on the nature and purpose of CBAs, the meaning of re-
decision in a settled, principled, or evenhanded way." Brett M. Kavanaugh, Fixing Stat-
utory Interpretation, 129 HARv. L. RE. 2118, 2118 (2016) (book review). The concurrence
in M & G appears to leave the determination of whether a contract is ambiguous to the
court without the aid of extrinsic evidence (a parol evidence question): "But when the
contract is ambiguous, a court may consider extrinsic evidence to determine the inten-
tions of the parties." M & G Polymers USA, L.L.C. v. Tackett, 135 S. Ct. 926, 938
(2015) (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
120. FARNswoRTH, supra note 116, at 453.
121. Int'l Union v. Yard-Man, Inc., 716 F.2d 1476, 1479 (6th Cir 1983) ("The in-
tended meaning of even the most explicit language can, of course, only be understood
in light of the context which gave rise to its inclusion.").
122. Silverstein, supra note 118, at 254-55.
123. M & G, 135 S. Ct. at 931.
124. Id. at 935.
125. Id. ("As an initial matter, Yard-Man violates ordinary contract principles by
placing a thumb on the scale in favor of vested retiree benefits in all collective-bargain-
ing agreements. That rule has no basis in ordinary principles of contract law.").
126. Id. (quoting WILLsTON ON CONTRACTS § 30:2, supra note 72).
127. Id. at 936-37.
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tiree benefits, and the language of the CBA as a whole, were at least
relevant under ordinary contract principles.' 2 8 For example, basic eco-
nomic theory assumes that rational economic actors engaged in bar-
gaining make trade-offs to maximize their returns. This supports the
deferred compensation argument that the union may have bargained
for non-mandatory lifetime healthcare benefits in exchange for less im-
mediate compensation, regardless of the technical ERISA definitions
the Court noted.1 29 Similarly, tying one benefit, silent on duration,
to a lifetime benefit is at least probative of whether the former also
lasts a lifetime. And it should be remembered that an inference is
not a presumption, it only means that the dispute should survive dis-
missal and permit a decision by the trier of fact.
The Supreme Court should not have objected that the Sixth Cir-
cuit's Yard-Man inferences in Tackett I and II did not come from the
record. Although the record contained the text of the CBA that was si-
lent on the duration of healthcare benefits, it included other probative
language on duration. 130 By its very nature, purpose, and language,
such an agreement has implications, including the Yard-Man infer-
ences, which a court should consider even if the implications are insuf-
ficient to shift the burden of proof.131
To clarify, it may be helpful to consider other inferences and pre-
sumptions arising solely from the nature of the transaction. For exam-
ple, in the absence of time-for-payment provisions, courts in construc-
tion cases find a duty to pay only after substantial performance.1 3 2
More generally, absent a term defining the order of performance, the
party whose performance takes longer usually must perform first.1 33
In sales-of-goods agreements, "tender of payment is a condition to
the seller's duty to tender and complete any delivery."1 34
128. Id. at 936.
129. See Tackett v. M & G Polymers USA, L.C.C., 561 F.3d 478, 489 (6th Cir. 2009)
("[B]ecause retirement health care benefits are not mandatory or required to be included
in an agreement, and because they are 'typically understood as a form of delayed com-
pensation or reward for past services,' it is unlikely that they would be 'left to the con-
tingencies of future negotiations.'") (quoting Yolton v. El Paso Tenn. Pipeline Co., 435
F.3d 571, 580 (6th Cir. 2006) (quoting Int'l Union v. Yard-Man, Inc., 716 F.2d 1476,
1481-82 (6th Cir. 1983))).
130. M & G, 135 S. Ct. at 936-37.
131. The parties in M & G bargained in the shadow of Yard-Man and other deci-
sions finding lifetime retiree healthcare benefits. The Court did not discuss whether
the holding in those cases alone should have raised an inference or even a presumption
in favor of the plaintiffs on the theory that the parties likely intended to incorporate the
holdings in their agreement. The nature of the bargaining in M & G, namely the lack of
negotiating clarity, discussed infra notes 143-64, and the considerable differences in the
language of the CBA in each case, which are the primary factors for determining intent,
suggest otherwise.
132. See, e.g., Stewart v. Newbury, 115 N.E. 984, 985 (N.Y. 1917).
133. See Edwin W. Patterson, Constructive Conditions in Contracts, 42 COLUM. L.
REV. 903, 919 (1942).
134. U.C.C. § 2-511(1) (Am. LAw INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM'N 1994).
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As previously noted, the Supreme Court apparently found the
Yard-Man inferences insufficiently persuasive to form a presumption
and to shift the burden of proof to M & G. However, the Court should
not have taken the inferences off the table.
B. The Court's Arbitrary Identification of "Ordinary Contract
Principles"
The Supreme Court selectively identified the "ordinary contract
principles" the Sixth Circuit should have applied in Tackett I and II.
Compare what the Supreme Court treated as disqualified Yard-Man
inferences' 3 5 to those the Court found acceptable. For example, the
Court said that a "written agreement is presumed to encompass the
whole agreement of the parties." 3 6 Further, promises silent on dura-
tion "will ordinarily be treated . . . as 'operative for a reasonable
time."'"3 In addition, "traditional rules of contractual interpretation
require a clear manifestation of intent before conferring a benefit or
obligation."13 8 And finally, "when a contract is silent as to the duration
of retiree benefits, a court may not infer that the parties intended
those benefits to vest for life."' 39
The Court's set of "ordinary contract principles" is too general and
abstract to be useful. The presumption that a written agreement en-
compasses the entire agreement does not further analysis if the entire
agreement is ambiguous, contradictory, or silent on the disputed
issue.'4 0 Further, the "whole-agreement" argument ignores the fact
that the Sixth Circuit derived the Yard-Man inferences directly from
the agreement. Further, a "reasonable" duration depends, at least in
part, on the type of agreement, its purpose, and its circumstances.
Thus, a "reasonable" duration can sometimes contemplate a lifetime.
The clear-manifestation-of-intent principle is so broad that it is use-
less. Taken literally, any contract ambiguous or silent on a "benefit
or obligation" would never be enforceable. The prohibition against in-
ferring benefits for life when the contract is silent, although more spe-
cifically tied to the issues in M & G, is overbroad because it would
seemingly bar all retiree claims from ever reaching the fact finder.
135. See supra notes 73-98, 129, and accompanying text.
136. M & G Polymers USA, L.L.C. v. Tackett, 135 S. Ct. 926, 936 (2015).
137. Id. (quoting CoRBIN ON CoNRAcTs § 553, supra note 86).
138. Id. (quoting Int'l Union v. Yard-Man, Inc., 716 F.2d 1476, 1481 n.2 (6th Cir
1983).
139. Id. at 937.
140. The Court complained that post-Yard-Man decisions created a default vesting
rule that "distort[ed] the text of the agreement and conflict[ed] with the principle of con-
tract law that the written agreement is presumed to encompass the whole agreement of
the parties." Id. at 936. But how the "whole agreement" treated duration of a retiree ben-
efit was the issue in the case. A default rule one way or the other would therefore not
conflict with the "whole agreement" rule.
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Such rules of interpretation are not helpful in reaching a reasonable
interpretation of the P&I.
Significantly, the Court omitted several relevant interpretive
"principles" similar to those it did discuss, such as ambiguous lan-
guage is interpreted against the drafter; parties intend common, not
unusual, meanings of language; specific language takes precedence
over general language; and interpretation that upholds a contract is
preferred. 14 1 The problem with these so-called rules and the ones
the Court singled out is that one suspects courts utilize them predomi-
nantly to support decisions reached on other, more specific grounds. If
these general rules contradict a court's preferred decision, courts ignore
them or apply a readily available counter-rule.1 42 However, such rules
should not be ignored. Instead, they should be treated precisely as the
Supreme Court should have treated the Yard-Man inferences-as one
of several tools to determine the meaning of language.
C. M & G Is Better Analyzed as a Gap Case
The trial court's summation of the plaintiffs' pertinent testimony
and the evidence revealed in the various decisions demonstrate that
the parties never reached agreement on the duration of retiree health-
care benefits.1 43 The search for the "intentions of the parties" was
therefore bound to fail.144
Testimony highlighted at retrial after Tackett I centered on
whether the side letters that capped benefits and required retiree con-
tributions were enforceable as part of the agreement, rather than on
the meaning of the agreement itself.14 5 However, the trial court's dis-
cussion of the testimony reveals the extent to which negotiations were
141. Tackett III points out that "[t]he Court did not purport to discuss all of the or-
dinary principles of contract law." Tackett v. M & G Polymers USA, L.L.C., 811 E3d 204,
208 (6th Cir. 2016).
142. The use of rules and maxims in interpretation "is often more ceremonial (as
being decorative rationalizations of decisions already reached on other grounds) than
persuasive (as moving the court toward a decision not yet reached) . . . . Indeed, a
court can often select from among pairs of opposing or countervailing rules that seem
to conflict . . . ." FARNsWORTH, supra note 116, at 456-57; see also Edwin W. Patterson,
The Interpretation and Construction of Contracts, 64 COLUM. L. REv. 833, 852 (1964).
143. This is apparently very often the case in retiree-benefit negotiations. "[Fjor
the Sixth Circuit to be concentrating on intent evidence seems disingenuous. In most cir-
cumstances neither party considered the issue, thus making the search for evidence of
intent an elusive one." Rogers, supra note 15, at 1054. Counsel for petitioner in the
oral argument before the Supreme Court seemed to concede as much in arguing that
the Court must look to "the operative default rules that-that we assume that if the par-
ties didn't contract around." Transcript of Oral Argument at 8-9, M & G, 135 S. Ct. 926
(No. 13-1010).
144. In fact, the Supreme Court sometimes accepts this fact by trying to determine
what to do "when a contract is silent as to the duration of retiree benefits . . . ." M & G,
135 S. Ct. at 937.
145. See Tackett v. M & G Polymers USA, L.L.C., 853 F. Supp. 2d 697, 703-09 (S.D.
Ohio 2012).
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ill-informed and haphazard. For example, union workers and officials
testified to being unaware "of any employer contribution limit or
cap" 146 and believed the union "never intended to have retirees pay
a premium." 4 7 M & G's human resources director testified "that he
was not trained in benefits administration and that he [had] only a
basic understanding of ERISA requirements."1 48 According to the di-
rector, M & G had never sent the requisite ERISA notice to retirees
concerning possible benefit termination.1 49 M & G's lawyer, in turn,
testified that he relied on the untrained director "to be the primary ar-
chitect" for the agreement. 5 0 Further, the lawyer testified "he never
did any research" concerning the side letters' applicability and "he
had never read the 2000 P&I agreement cover to cover." 15 1 At one
point, the lawyer stated the side letters did not apply.1 52 The trial
court concluded:
The factual history that the parties present could not be more differ-
ent .... [Tihe parties' decade-plus history of dealing with the cap let-
ters and contributions does not present a model of negotiating clar-
ity, much less competence . . .. [T]he significant confusion by the
parties is odd .... [E]ven key actors were confused by what essen-
tially hidden agreements applied in what context . . .. This is no
way to run a business or a union . . . . [Investors should know
what company liabilities exist, unions at all levels should be clear
on what they are negotiating, and retirees should know what agree-
ments they are ratifying. 53
Contradictory language in the agreement, as well as M & G's ef-
fort to prove the side letters were part of the agreement, also demon-
strate that the parties did not agree on the duration issue.154 Ex-
hibit B-1, referenced in the P&I, included the following introductory
language: "Effective January 1, 1998, and for the duration of this
Agreement thereafter, the Employer will provide the following pro-
gram of hospital benefits, hospital-medical benefits, surgical benefits
and prescription drug benefits for eligible employees and their depen-
dents ... ."15 By tying the benefits to the existing three-year CBA, the
146. Id. at 703-04.
147. Id. at 705.
148. Id. at 708. The trial court called the director "curiously under-informed." Id.
at 718.
149. Id. at 708.
150. Id. at 709.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 717.
153. Id. at 715, 717-18. A more charitable explanation for the duration gap is that
the parties feared that pursuing the duration issue would defeat the agreement, but the
facts recited in the various opinions do not support this explanation.
154. Id. at 719-20.
155. M & G Polymers USA, L.L.C. v. Tackett, 135 S. Ct. 926, 931 (2015). Of course,
Exhibit B-1 may mean only that the particular description of the benefits lasts for dura-
tion of the CBA.
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"duration" language suggests that the benefits would only last for
three years. As referenced by the Supreme Court concurrence, other
language, however, suggests that the healthcare benefits would last
for the retirees' lifetime:
Because the retirees have a vested, lifetime right to a monthly pen-
sion . . . a provision stating that retirees "will receive" health-care
benefits if they are "receiving a monthly pension" is relevant to
this examination.... So is a "survivor benefits" clause instructing
that if a retiree dies, her surviving spouse will "continue to receive
[the retiree's health-care] benefits . .. until death or remarriage."1 5 6
Recall, also, that M & G sought to prove that the side letters re-
quiring contributions and capping benefits were part of the agree-
ment.15 7 This suggests M & G did not believe the P&I agreement
alone reached those issues. Instead, M & G's effort shows it sought,
but failed, to cap benefits.' 5 8
At oral argument, Justice Alito asked why the bargainers left the
CBA silent on the duration of healthcare benefits.1 5 9 In the absence of
a satisfactory answer by respondents, Justice Scalia remarked, "I
mean, this thing [the duration issue] is obviously an important fea-
ture. Both sides knew it was left unaddressed, so, you know, whoever
loses deserves to lose for casting this upon us when it could have been
said very clearly in the contract. Such an important feature."1 6 0 In ad-
dition to Justice Scalia's and the trial court's intimation that incompe-
tence was the answer,' 6 ' both sides may have had a strategic reticence
to raise the issue. Union and management lawyers familiar with col-
lective bargaining, particularly on vesting of healthcare benefits, con-
cede they are willing to live with uncertainty because of the dangers of
even raising the issue during bargaining.1 62 The union worries that if
it raises the issue, but fails to get the company to agree to vesting, the
CBA, by implication, will not include lifetime benefits.1 63 This is so
even if the union tries to clarify that it is only seeking an express pro-
vision for what it believes is implicit, namely, lifetime benefits. Simi-
156. Id. at 938 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
157. Tackett, 853 F. Supp. 2d at 715.
158. Id. ("Defendants have engaged in after-the-fact company scrambling to find a
way to impose unilaterally application of cap letters as a cost-savings measure that de-
fies the agreements the caps puncture.").
159. Transcript of Oral Argument at 18, M & G, 135 S. Ct. 926 (No. 13-1010).
160. Id. at 22.
161. See supra notes 146-53 and accompanying text.
162. Responses to inquiries from the author. The lawyers preferred to remain
anonymous. See also Jonathan Kane, We Have to Give Them What? Negotiating the
First Contract from the Employer's Perspective, at 10, 2010 A.B.A. SEC. LAB. & EMP.
LAW CONF., http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/abaladministrative/labor-law/
meetings/2010/annualconference/180.authcheckdam.pdf (demonstrating how healthcare
negotiations during collective bargaining can lead to notable concessions).
163. Tackett, 853 F. Supp. 2d at 715.
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larly, the company does not want to bargain for the expiration of
healthcare benefits because, if it fails to get agreement, the implication
will be that benefits vest. Each side may be content to rely on context
and the implication of other terms in the CBA to establish its view of
the healthcare benefits duration.
One can conclude that the parties here, and likely others in many
additional cases involving disputes over the duration of retiree health-
care benefits, failed to reach agreement because of strategic decision-
making and rather inept bargaining and drafting.'" Therefore,
under ordinary contract principles, the M & G Court should have fo-
cused neither on finding "the intentions of the parties" nor how to
treat ambiguous language. Instead, the Court should have determined
how to fill the contract duration gap.
Courts do not enforce contracts with a material gap or multiple
gaps. 165 In large part, this ordinary contract principle results from
courts' inability to fashion a remedy if an important term, such as
the price of goods or the subject matter of an agreement, is missing.16 6
Nevertheless, another ordinary contract principle allows courts to sup-
ply a missing contract term if the parties intended to contract and the
gap or gaps are not too severe.16 7 Clearly, the parties in M & G in-
tended to contract, and the missing duration term should not invali-
date the entire agreement.' 6 8
Courts employ a diversity of gap filling techniques. One approach
considers "what the parties would have done" to align the court's deci-
sion most closely with the principle of freedom-of-contract. This ap-
proach also reduces the costs of contracting by creating a default
rule that eliminates the need for future bargaining over that
164. See Rogers, supra note 15, at 1046 (discussing Int'l Union v. Cadillac Mallea-
ble Iron Co., No. G82-75-CA1, 1982 WL 20483, at *4 (W.D. Mich. Apr. 28, 1982) ("the
court acknowledged that the duration of retiree benefits had never been discussed dur-
ing contract negotiations . . . .")).
165. See, e.g., Champaign Nat'l Bank v. Landers Seed Co., 519 N.E.2d 957, 959-60
(Ill. App. Ct. 1988) ("The terms of a contract must be reasonably certain. Some terms
may be missing or left to be agreed upon, but if the essential term or terms are so uncer-
tain that there is no basis for deciding whether the agreement has been kept or broken,
there is no contract.").
166. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CoNTRACTs § 33 (AM. LAw INST 1981) ("[R]emedies for
breach of contract must have a basis in the agreement of the parties.").
167. Zielinski v. Pabst Brewing Co., 463 F.3d 615, 619-20 (7th Cir. 2006) ("Filling
gaps is a standard activity of courts in contract cases.").
168. Sometimes it is difficult to determine whether a court has filled a gap after
concluding that the parties never reached agreement on an issue or the court has inter-
preted an agreement objectively. The Yard-Man and Tackett Sixth Circuit decisions are
good examples. One explanation of the court's rationale in such decisions is that, accord-
ing to a reasonable interpretation of the agreement, the retiree healthcare benefits
vested. Another explanation of the rationale, however, is that the court supplied the
duration term for the parties as a matter of gap-filling. The line is fine between the
two processes and rarely should affect outcomes, although courts filling gaps may feel
more freedom to innovate.
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term.169 Although courts struggle in determining what the parties
would have preferred, this approach may be the most prominent gap
filler.1 7 0
Another judicial gap-filling tool is establishing a "penalty default"
to incentivize information sharing between contracting parties. For ex-
ample, the famous case of Hadley v Baxendale,171 involving delay in
the carriage of a miller's broken crank shaft, is an example of a "pen-
alty default," that
penalizes the miller for failing to reveal the ramifications of tardy de-
livery (the loss of profits). The miller's penalty is that it cannot re-
cover the lost profits. Further, were it not for the Hadley rule, the
miller would have an incentive not to disclose. The information
would lead the carrier to raise its price of carriage because it
would be taking a greater risk (assuming that most millers do not
suffer lost profits due to a carrier delay). In sum, penalty-default the-
orists assert that Hadley creates incentives for the miller to reveal
information and for the carrier to select the appropriate level of
precaution. 172
Of course, identifying efficient gap-fillers is often challenging for
courts. Cases on the duration of retiree healthcare benefits are no ex-
ception. A gap-filler that healthcare benefits vest could discourage em-
ployers from offering healthcare plans at all, especially as healthcare
costs rise.1 73 However, promises of retirement security help companies
recruit and maintain a dedicated, efficient workforce. Retirement se-
curity also keeps retirees out of public assistance programs.1 74
Courts should also consider how to incentivize companies and un-
ions to draft express duration clauses that avoid costly litigation. Un-
fortunately, courts faced with the duration issue have not sought to
motivate parties in this direction.' 7 5 Perhaps too many companies
have relied on the "default rule" that "contractual obligation will
cease, in the ordinary course, upon termination of the bargaining
169. HILLMAN, supra note 110, at 293-94 (citing RIcHARD POSNER, EcoNomic ANALYSIs
OF LAw 96-98 (7th ed. 2007).
170. See id. at 293-94 for additional discussion.
171. (1854) 156 Eng. Rep. 145.
172. HulMAN, supra note 110, at 295; see also id. at 180-81 (discussing Ian Ayres &
Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default
Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87 (1989)).
173. See generally Christine Eibner & M. Susan Marquis, Employers' health insur-
ance cost burden, 1996-2005, MONTHLY LAB. REV. 28-44 (June 2008), https://www.bls.gov/
opub/mlr/2008/06/art3full.pdf.
174. Tackett v. M & G Polymers USA, L.L.C., 853 F. Supp. 2d 697, 710 (S.D. Ohio
2012) ("[I t is in the public interest to transfer the burden of coverage to the private com-
pany that included such coverage in its bargaining and not to keep much of the burden of
providing health care coverage on the public by forcing numerous retirees and their de-
pendents to rely upon public assistance programs.").
175. See generally Rogers, supra note 15, for a discussion of cases following Yard-
Man; see also infra notes 196-212 and accompanying text for cases after M & G.
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agreement."17 6 This strategy is risky because it requires parties to pre-
dict whether their circumstances fit into the "ordinary course."1
A third gap-filling tool is for courts to construct what they believe
is a fair gap-filler. Courts may consider the case's equities, including
bargaining power, wrongful conduct, and the potential gains and
losses of each party, with the goal to ensure that each party receives
its fair bargain.' 7 8 A court here seeks to avoid creating a windfall
for one party and a catastrophe for the other.' 7 9
In light of this discussion, re-consider Tackett II. On the one hand,
the Sixth Circuit found the retirees were entitled to lifetime health-
care benefits, but on the other, it held that the retirees would receive
these benefits subject to "reasonable changes" in costs. 8 0 The court ob-
served that such changes were necessary to accommodate increased
healthcare costs.' 8 "Reasonable changes," however, would not reduce
benefits to zero. 18 2 The court took both parties' interests into account
and arguably provided the fairest solution, especially compared to
other gap-filling techniques. Of course, determining what constitutes
"reasonable changes" may challenge courts in some cases.1 83
Precedent exists for such a compromise in other contexts. For ex-
ample, in Haines v. City of New York,1 84 the city had agreed with cer-
tain villages that were polluting streams forming part of the city's
water supply to build and maintain a sewage treatment facility. 185 De-
cades later, the municipalities sued, alleging the agreement required
the city to expand the facility to accommodate the unanticipated dra-
matic increase in the need for sewer lines caused by the municipalities'
population growth.18 6 The New York Court of Appeals reached a com-
promise, holding that the city was obligated to maintain the plant, but
not to expand the facility.187 The court did not perpetually bind the city
to accommodate population increases, nor did it find the agreement
terminable at the city's will.' 88 The court thus filled the gap by fash-
ioning an equitable solution.' 8 9
176. Litton Fin. Printing Div. v. NLRB, 501 U.S. 190, 207 (1991).
177. See infra notes 190-201 and accompanying text.
178. HILLMAN, supra note 110, at 296-97.
179. Id. at 296.
180. Tackett v. M & G Polymers, USA, L.L.C., 733 F.3d 589, 600-01 (6th Cir. 2013).
181. Id. at 601.
182. Id. at 600-01.
183. See, e.g., Reese v. CNH Indus. NV., 143 F. Supp. 3d 609, 626-30 (E.D. Mich.
2015).
184. 364 N.E.2d 820 (N.Y. 1977).
185. Id. at 821.
186. Id. at 821-22.
187. Id. at 822.
188. Id. at 822-23.
189. Id.; see also City of Yonkers v. Otis Elevator Co., 844 F.2d 42, 47-49 (2d Cir.
1988); RESTATEMENT OF EMpLoYMENT LAw § 2.06 (AM. LAw INsT. 2015) ("An employer may
prospectively modify or revoke its binding policy statements if it provides reasonable ad-
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III. The Sixth Circuit's Challenge on Remand
The Sixth Circuit faced a challenge on remand. Part of the prob-
lem, as already noted, was the Supreme Court's lack of clarity on
whether it objected to the Yard-Man inferences as together forming
a presumption of lifetime benefits or objected to each inference individ-
ually.190 Put another way, was there any role left for contextual evi-
dence concerning the now-defunct inferences? What exactly did the
Court mean by stating that the Sixth Circuit wrongly allowed Yard-
Man inferences to "put a thumb on the scale"?
Another issue was what portions of the Yard-Man reasoning de-
pended upon rejected "inferences?" For example, Yard-Man contrasted
the many duration terms in the CBA concerning such things as insur-
ance and family benefits with the absence of a retiree healthcare dura-
tion term.191 According to the Sixth Circuit, this suggested the dura-
tion of retiree healthcare benefits should be treated differently from
the terminable insurance and family benefits. 192 The Supreme Court
did not expressly reject this reasoning. Yard-Man also pointed to man-
agement's course of dealing, suggesting that retiree healthcare bene-
fits vested: "Yard-Man's own course of conduct in continuing retiree in-
surance benefits after plant closure beyond the point at which
insurance benefits could have been terminated for active employees in-
dicates that it did not consider retiree benefits to be tied to the dura-
tional limitations of that active group." 193 This was also not discussed
by the Supreme Court.
A third issue was whether the Court's rejection of the Yard-Man
inferences meant the lower courts would have to revisit the side let-
ters' legal significance. A close reading of the district court's descrip-
tion of trial testimony suggests the district court correctly disposed
vance notice of, or reasonably makes accessible, the modified statement or revocation to
the affected employees.").
190. See M & G Polymers USA, L.L.C. v. Tackett, 135 S. Ct. 926, 934-35 (2015); see
also supra text accompanying notes 103-07.
191. Int'l Union v. Yard-Man, Inc., 716 F.2d 1476, 1481 (6th Cir. 1983).
192. Id.
[T]he insurance provisions limit health insurance coverage for a retiree's
spouse and dependent children in case of the retiree's death to expiration of
the collective bargaining agreement. While this limitation does not preclude
an intent to also terminate the retiree's benefits with the expiration of the col-
lective bargaining agreement in any event, it is more reasonable to infer that
the spouse-dependent child provision was meant as an exception to the antic-
ipated continuation of benefits beyond the life of the collective bargaining
agreement.
Id.
193. Id.; see also Rogers, supra note 15, at 1047-48 (the company in Cadillac Mal-
leable Iron "had always paid insurance benefits to retirees during strikes . . . .").
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of this issue, 1 9 4 but M & G argued that the decision was made in the
"shadow of Yard-Man" and should be revisited.1 95
Following the Supreme Court's decision, the Sixth Circuit in Tack-
ett III remanded the case to the district court for the third time.' 96 The
Sixth Circuit thought it was unclear whether the district court's ear-
lier side letter decision had been influenced by Yard-Man.197 There-
fore, the trial court had to determine once again "whether the [side]
letters, or other documents, are part of the Agreement or may other-
wise serve as extrinsic evidence."1 98 The Sixth Circuit directed the dis-
trict court to "use ordinary principles of contract law" to assess
whether the side letters were part of the CBA, whether to entertain ex-
trinsic evidence, and, ultimately, whether the retiree healthcare bene-
fits vested. 199
The questions raised by the Supreme Court's decision-was the
Court rejecting the inferences because together they created a pre-
sumption? What Yard-Man reasoning, if any, survived the opinion?-
were not resolved by the Sixth Circuit's remand instructions to the
district court. In effect, the Sixth Circuit largely punted, with one ex-
ception. Tackett III appears to recognize the limited role of the agree-
ment's general duration clause:
[W]hile the Supreme Court's decision prevents us from presuming
that "absent specific durational language referring to retiree benefits
themselves, a general durational clause says nothing about the vest-
ing of retiree benefits," we also cannot presume that the absence of
such specific language, by itself, evidences an intent not to vest ben-
efits or that a general durational clause says everything about the in-
tent to vest.200
In other words, absent a specific term on the duration of healthcare re-
tiree benefits, a general duration clause is merely probative evidence.20 1
Two additional post-M & G cases also illustrate the confusion
wrought by the Court. In Reese v. CNH Industrial N. V,202 still another
case involving the duration of retiree healthcare benefits, the district
court first held that M & G required the court to reverse a previous
194. Tackett v. M & G Polymers USA, L.L.C., 811 F.3d 204, 210 (6th Cir. 2016)
(hereinafter Tackett III) ("On its face, the district court determined, independent of
Yard-Man or its inferences, that the cap letters were not part of the Agreements.").
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Id. As discussed previously, supra notes 58-60 and accompanying text,
M & G's efforts to show that the side letters limited the plaintiffs' healthcare rights sug-
gested that M & G did not believe that the P&I agreement alone did so.
199. Tackett I, 811 F3d at 210.
200. Id. at 209; see also Gallo v. Moen Inc, 813 F.3d 265, 268 (6th Cir. 2016) (rely-
ing in part on a general duration term).
201. Tackett III, 811 F.3d at 209.
202. 143 F. Supp. 3d 609 (E.D. Mich. 2015).
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district court decision in favor of retirees. 203 On reconsideration, how-
ever, the district court held that it had been "too hast[y]" and that the
Supreme Court did not intend to "require clear and express vesting
language to find the parties' intent to vest."204 The court specifically
responded to whether there was any role left for contextual evidence
related to the former inferences:
[This] [clourt erred in reading Tackett as "suggest[ing] that courts
should not rely on language tying eligibility for contribution-free
healthcare benefits to the receipt of pension benefits." All that Tack-
ett holds or suggests is that a court may not infer from such tying
language that the parties intended retiree health insurance benefits
to vest. Such language does not lose all significance, however. In
other words, Tackett does not hold that courts must ignore language
that under Yard-Man and its progeny inferred an intent to vest. To
the contrary, Tackett advises courts to apply "ordinary principles of
contract law"; and under those principles, "'the intention of the par-
ties'" is "gathered from the whole instrument . . . ."205
Based on this reasoning, among other things, the court reinvigorated
the argument tying healthcare benefits to vested pension benefits
and the assertion that the general duration clause "does not dictate
automatically that the agreement's general durational clause applies"
to retiree benefits.20 6
In Gallo v. Moen Inc.,207 however, the Sixth Circuit reversed a
trial court holding in favor of vested retiree healthcare benefits
based on the Supreme Court's "repudiation" of Yard-Man and its prog-
eny.208 The opinion reads as if the Yard-Man inferences no longer have
any place in a decision on vesting and refers to the general duration
term as a default rule that controls "[i]n the absence of specific lan-
guage in the retiree healthcare provisions." 209 A strong dissent
thought the majority placed "a thumb on the employer's scale"21 0 by
ignoring the context, including the "reality" first discussed in Yard-
Man that negotiations involve "give and take" over salary and bene-
fits. 2 11 The dissent thought the Yard-Man inferences remained alive
and well as probative evidence of the meaning of the CBA. 2 12
203. Id. at 610.
204. Id. at 612.
205. Id. at 613 (internal citation omitted).
206. Id.
207. 813 F.3d 265 (6th Cir. 2016).
208. Id. at 267.
209. Id. at 271-72.
210. Id. at 275 (Stranch, J., dissenting).
211. Id. at 277.
212. The Supreme Court declined to hear an appeal of this case. Gallo v. Moen,
Inc., 813 F.3d 265 (6th Cir. 2016); see also Sloan v. Borgwarner, Inc., No. 09-cv-10918,
2016 WL 7107228, at *12-13 (E.D. Mich. Dec. 5, 2016).
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Conclusion
An analysis of the M & G case leads to the following conclusions.
First, despite the Supreme Court's criticism of Yard-Man, no one
should doubt that the Yard-Man strategy of interpretation (as opposed
to the conclusions reached) reflects ordinary contract principles. In the
absence of an express term, the Yard-Man approach mandates a close
look at the contract and its circumstances. 213
Second, the important, but unresolved, controversy over whether
the textual or contextual approach to interpretation best reduces the
cost of contracting is not relevant here. None of the decisions examined
here maintained that the P&I agreement expressly determined the
vesting issue. A contextual investigation was inevitable.
Third, under these circumstances, the Court should have re-
manded the case to the Sixth Circuit without rejecting the Yard-
Man inferences, but with instructions that the inferences do not create
a presumption in favor of vesting.2 14 Put another way, the inferences,
at least along with other evidence such as the trial testimony, were suf-
ficient to get the case to the trier of fact, but not to create a presump-
tion in favor of vesting.
Fourth, the Court should have instructed the Sixth Circuit that if
a reasonable interpretation of the evidence demonstrated that the par-
ties never reached agreement on the vesting issue, the court must fill
the gap. A good argument can be made that the most acceptable gap-
filler was the Sixth Circuit's equitable solution in Tackett II that the
retirees' healthcare benefits lasted their lifetimes, but could be reason-
ably adjusted based on circumstances, such as the costs of providing
the benefit and the company's balance sheet. 2 15 This approach, not-
withstanding its complexity, would balance the uncertainties confront-
ing businesses with the concerns of retirees who must "fear [] the loss
of their family's healthcare coverage." 2 16
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court's attempt to clarify the Sixth
Circuit's treatment of the duration of retiree healthcare benefits failed.
More litigation is likely inevitable in retiree healthcare benefits cases
and beyond because, in truth, M & G is "both an example" of the inter-
pretation and gap filling quagmire "and a perpetuation of it."217 The
213. See supra note 121 and accompanying text.
214. In the M & G oral argument before the Supreme Court, respondents were ap-
parently content with a remand: "[If the Court wants to be sure that the judgment below
is, in fact, based on normal principles of contract interpretation, we are perfectly com-
fortable with a remand for that purpose." Transcript of Oral Argument at 26, M & G
Polymers USA, L.L.C. v. Tackett, 135 S. Ct. 926 (2015) (No. 13-1010).
215. Tackett v. M & G Polymers, USA, L.L.C., 733 F.3d 589, 600-01 (6th Cir. 2013).
216. Gallo, 813 F.3d at 277.
217. David Hoffman pointed this out after reading a draft of this article. E-mail
from David A. Hoffman, Prof. of Law, U. of Pa. Law Sch., to Robert A. Hillman, Prof.
of Law, Cornell Law Sch., (Aug. 12, 2016, 3:41 EST) (on file with author). For an article
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M & G case should also alert lawyers who are considering an impor-
tant issue at the bargaining stage to be more cognizant of the likely lit-
igation costs of declining to raise the issue and to include an express
term in the agreement.
situating the M & G decision within a larger trend in the Supreme Court, see Peter J.
Wiedenbeck, Untrustworthy: ERISA's Eroded Fiduciary Law, at 39-43 (Wash. Univ. in
St. Louis Law Sch. Legal Studies Research Paper No. 16-11-01, 2016), https://papers.
ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=2865752.
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